Tuesday, January 17, 2012

Naming things right: Concept Building as a Shortcut to Good Social Science

During and after color revolutions (concept 1) many observers and commenters manipulated labels and meanings of these events as they saw fit. They were labelled revolutions (concept 2), coups d'etat (concept 3) and what not. There were orange, rose, tulip, yellow, apricot, cotton and what not revolution or revolution attempts. GW Bush went as far as calling intervention into Iraq and first elections held under American supervision 'purple revolution.'

Politicians can do whatever they want. What sucks is that lots of people caught these terms and started using them widely, including myself. Now I am reviewing scholarship on events that occured in Serbia in 2000, in Georgia 2003, Ukraine 2004 and Kyrgyzstan 2005 (I am deliberately avoiding to label them under a common concept).

I counted half a dozen or so labels including, but not limited to, color revolution, discontinuous political trajectory, revolutionary coup d'etat, electoral revolution, fourth wave of democratization, democratic breakthrough, modular democratic revolution, failure of authoritarian consolidation, cycles of patronal presidentialism, democratizing elections and liberalizing electoral outcomes.

I am sure this is not an exhaustive link. I am also sure that some of those definitions have been well defined and articulated. Finally I am sure that multiplicity of terms refers to the multiplicity of approaches authors take to this complex phenomena and that scholarly dialogue on the subject is ultimately good. However, I also want some conceptual clarity and discrimination/restriction. We can not nave twenty terms to denote a single event or class of events. If not narrowed down, rich dialogue on concept building will prevent formation of an effective toolkit to use such things in practice.

(Here is how a Cambridge scholar try to clarify the terms, I will need to expand this list and do it in a map/Venn diagram format. Source: Lane 2009, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 25(2))


and introduce a new term (same source)


 Moreover, what is missing is a map of relationships between proposed concepts. My intuitive feeling is that related or competing concepts either address different aspects of the same phenomena or denote events that have family resemblance to each other. This is especially evident when one wants to use the fast growing literature on color revolutions and non-violent change on current events.

 Let's take the example of Russia, which had fraudulent parliamentary elections in December and will have presidential elections in 2012. What basically interests me is will Putin lose power. Which term should I use if I don't care much about the small 'lab rat' nuances of how he does that, and just want a practical, short crisp answer based on a theory or rather theories? I will be doing it and blogging about it, but first will need to get down with the while conceptual mess.

 My limited knowledge of social movement theory, for example, shows that social science can come up with handy, readily-usable and functional definitions of what they study without being too theoretically shallow. So why not do it for regime change/democratization/contention studies?

 So far I think the best, simples definition I came across in a book by Bunce and Wolchik published in 2011 (Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries, CUP 2011). It is on the cutting edge of scholarship on these events and the two have commanded their immense resources in a really good way to come up with a really good book full of nice ideas. Their definition of these events is democratizing elections (those elections that happen in competitive authoritarianisms and in which challengers win) (page 17).

 In retrospect all that was needed to be done to build a good concept was to see whether the available concept capture the phenomenon under study. I am sure most of the times it does. I learned my lesson.

Thursday, December 15, 2011

Measuring Strength of Oppositions

Imagine you are constructing a model of color revolutions and "strength of opposition" is one of the variables you need to reliably measure. How to do that?

 Of course by opposition here we mean not act of opposing something, but rather institutionalized groups that act in opposition to incumbent governments. In this sense it is both opposition as minority in legislative or opposition that is beyond the legal field - e.g. pro-democracy groups in exile, religious or neo Marxist groups etc.

 One of the ways of course, the easiest one would be to look at how much vote they ripped off from the government or the level of approval through polls and surveys. However, most of the political setting do not render that a promising exercise. What is essentially left is constructing a compositve variable which would incorporate different aspects of opposition politics that can be reliably observed at the distance. What immediately comes to mind is a composite index consisting of questions as "Have they ever been in power?" "Are they outlawed or are within legal field?" "Are they institutionalized as a political party?" etc. as well as questions about their ideological standing and appeal to public etc.

 My quick googling of political science literature did not bring any tangible results. It seems that there is no "opposition strenght index" as such. I think fragments of this index can be found in other indices, e.g. Polity IV or Freedom House, but a more general and comprehensive index has yet to be constructed.

 I also gave a quick look at the classics of the discipline. It seems that Shapiro, Dahl, Kirchheimer have devoted some attention to the issue, clarified conceptualization, attempted categorization and some causal relationships and trends, but can't say I really saw them measuring something.

 Meanwhile, badly need it to run a quantitative model of color revolutions

Tuesday, December 13, 2011

Pro-presidential parties are not effective anymore

Before 2010 there were three ways to consolidate authoritarianism (Putin knows it and did all three) - 1. built vertical of power, appointing governors and making them deliver votes as part of the political machine and eliminate checks and balances in the system 2. undermine independent wealth - imprison oligarchs, it is fairly easy given all the violations of 90s' privatizations and take their media resources, or, alternatively coopt them into power and 3. build a pro-presidential party that will unite elites under one person or idea and keep them in check, so that there are no political forces astray and there is no alternative organized political force in the country.

Some leaders did not do the third thing, preferring instead to jockey on elite disagreements and acting as independent above-clan arbiters (Kuchma, for example). They did not, therefore, explicity support any parties, nor did they stick themselves to any. Some of them are still around, some have been kicked out.

Some did this as an additional check against color revolutions and for the time being, it worked. The mechanism was explained quite simply by daughter of President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan: to consolidate/form a party "with which no other party will be able to compete in the next 50 years." As it usually happens, the institutional innovation came from Russia and was quickly and effectively adopted in Kazakhstan (Nur Otan party) and even Kyrgyzstan (notorious Alga, Kyrgyzstan and then Ak Jol). Outside the CIS the model was also adopted - one example I am aware of is pro-presidential Constitutional Democratic Rally in Tunisia, though the party was founded long before Putin came to power.

But the signs coming are now that such pro-presidential parties are losing ground, as their functionaries "bring down" popularity of their founders by inertia (Russia, Kazakhstan) or vice versa (Tunisia). Putin long used United Russia to pursue his agenda and keep elites united, but now when UR is hated and termed "party of crooks and thieves" it should be hard for Putin to get rid of them and stay clean.

A natural reaction from autocrats might be to let the hated parties "sink" and get new faces to the new fake parties. Part of the game will involve creation of pseudo-opposition and this is what is going on now in Russia with the fake pro-business and rightist parties coming to the political arena. Maybe they are geniune in their opposition and pro-business attitudes, but the burden of proof and demonstration lies with those suspected of hidden complicity to Kremlin's agenda

p.s. when looking up something on Tunisia I saw this picture. If not for the appeal on the right, would have thought Ben Ali got much older and lost weight :)

Thursday, September 16, 2010

A Mini-Debate on Relevance of Political Science

Statement: Ezra Klein of Washington Post
Poli Sci 101: Presidential speeches don't matter, and lobbyists don't run D.C.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/10/AR2010091002671.html
Examples of four good research pieces and complaints about inattention to APSA Sept 2010 meeting by policy-makers.

Rebuttal: Steven Hayward of American Enterprise Institute
The Irrelevance of Modern Political Science

http://www.american.com/archive/2010/september/the-irrelevance-of-modern-political-science
Examples of "trashy" topics and juxtaposition with economic science and criticism of preoccupation with quantiative methods


Re-statement John Sides, a political scientist who contributes to The Monkey Cage blog
On the Irrelevance of Political Science
http://www.themonkeycage.org/2010/09/on_the_irrelevance_of_politica_1.html
Criticizes Haywards one-sided choice of topics and his juxtaposition of polisci people with economists and advances explanations for polisci research not being so outspoken and popularized as economics research.

I found good arguements in all three pieces.
Enjoy if you have a professional crisis like I do right now!

Tuesday, September 14, 2010

Another analytic publication contributed

In August I published another article with Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst (cacianalyst.org), discussing the failed coup attempt by Urmat Baryktabasov against the background of failing transitional government in Kyrgyzstan. You can access it here: http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5386

Back to academia

After serving as an Assistant Executive Secretary with Central Asia and the Caucasus Association of Agricultural Research Institutions (www.cacaari.org) for almost a year, I returned to political science and research - joined IMT-Lucca Institute for Advanced Studies in a beautiful Toscan town of Lucca in Italy. I am not currently absolutely confident about what topic I will take up to dedicate my next several years to, currently only refreshing statistics and improving my quantitative analysis skills.